System and Method of Preventing Hijacking of Security Systems and Components

ABSTRACT

A decentralized component is provided as an overly for a centralized system architecture as represented, for example, by a regional monitoring system. The decentralized components provide additional authentication of communications with a displaced monitoring service. Where agents of the decentralized component detect the presence of an unauthenticated monitoring service, messages can be generated, or other actions taken, to respond to that monitoring service.

FIELD

The application pertains to systems and methods of preventing hijacking of security systems which have a centralized architecture. More particularly, the application pertains to such systems and methods which provide a decentralized component which includes watch dog agents to monitor and authenticate communications with a displaced monitoring service.

BACKGROUND

Security system monitoring services compete with each other for subscribers. As a result, it's not uncommon for these services to modify, replace, or add to the components of exiting security system installations to acquire (i.e. hijack) subscribers from competitors. This is particularly disruptive since monitoring services often subsidize the costs of the security system components and initial installation.

Known monitored security systems often utilize a centralized architecture such that command and control of the system originates from the monitoring service. This architecture depends on the monitoring service maintaining a secure communications channel with the monitored installation. If this channel is hijacked by a competing service, the competing service can also hijack the associated subscribers' account and associated income. This process is often referred to as a ‘man-in-the-middle’ cyber attack. Such practices often violate previous contracts between the monitoring service that paid for the initial installation and that installation's subscriber. Likewise they are also assigned a high priority in the cyber threat models used in the design of the security systems.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 illustrates a block diagram of a system in accordance herewith.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

While disclosed embodiments can take many different forms, specific embodiments thereof are shown in the drawings and will be described herein in detail with the understanding that the present disclosure is to be considered as an exemplification of the principles thereof as well as the best mode of practicing same, and is not intended to limit the application or claims to the specific embodiment illustrated.

In one aspect, a decentralized component to the mostly centralized system architecture referred to above for the purpose of preventing the unauthorized hijacking referred to above. More generally it provides added protection against man-in-the- middle cyber attacks.

In a disclosed embodiment, the decentralized component is implemented by designing ‘watch dog’ agents into the components of the security systems, especially those located at the edges of the network underlying the system architecture (e.g. sensors, device control points, user interface devices, etc.). In accordance herewith, the watch dog agents continuously provide additional authentication of communications with the monitoring service. Agents can also be implemented in a stand-alone form and be installed in the region of interest.

If a component's watch dog determines the communications is no longer authentic, then that component could for example initiate a notification of the parties involved and/or stop functioning or degrade its performance in such a way as to negate the incentive for hijacking. Local authentication software and/or circuitry can also be provided to evaluate messages received from the agents.

FIG. 1 illustrates aspects, as discussed above, of a system 10 in accordance herewith. Relevant types of systems 10, without limitation, include at least regional security and/or ambient condition monitoring systems, or, building automation systems.

Exemplary system 10 includes a system control element, or panel, 12. Element 12 can include a plurality of I/O interfaces 12 a, local control circuits 12 b, authentication software and/or circuitry 12 c and a local user interface 12 d with audio/visual inputs and outputs to enable a local user to check system operation, enter comments or parameters or carry out communications as needed.

As those of skill will understand, element 12, via interfaces 12 a, can be in communication with a plurality of detectors, input or output devices, generally indicated at 14. The devices of the plurality 14, such as 14 i, can include ambient condition detectors such as intrusion detectors without limitation, condition sensing detectors such as smoke or fire detectors, as well as alarm indicating input or output devices.

The members of the plurality 14 can communicate with the control element 12 via wired or wireless media, indicated generally at 16. Members of the plurality 14 would be installed as appropriate in a region R being monitored and controlled.

Control element 12 can be in communication, via one or more wired or wireless media, such as 20 a, b and a computer network 20 c with a monitoring service facility 22 which is usually not co-located with the system 10. The facility 22 is the authentic facility intended to provide security, monitoring or control functions relative to region R via the system 10. Facility 22 can evaluate conditions in region R based on signals and information collected via the local control element 12. Depending on the circumstances facility 22 can communicate information or messages as to region R via network 20 c with a user's communication device, phone or computer, 24.

Conceptually, it will be understood that systems, such as system 10 can be characterized as having a tree-like structure. Nodes are located at the tree root (referred to below as ‘the root’ or ‘root node’) and at each branch point representing the functions common to a security, fire detection, or premises automation system (referred to below as ‘the system’). In this configuration, branches represent the flow of communications between the nodes.

The terminating or edge nodes (referred to below as ‘edges’ or ‘edge’) furthest from the root typically represent sensors, device control points, user interface devices, etc.

The nodes between the root and the edges are referred to as intermediate nodes or simply ‘intermediates’. The structure of the tree between the root and edges varies based on system design requirements and constraints. The intermediates typically represent one or more control panels, power supplies, communications repeaters/hubs, etc.

The root node is normally not physically co-located at the installation sites of the intermediate and edge nodes. Likewise logical groupings of intermediate and edge nodes may be installed at physically separate sites.

After system installation is completed, the root node of the tree represents the monitoring, command, and control point, such as monitoring facility 22, having the highest authority within the system. The root is typically owned by what we refer to as the monitoring service.

The monitoring service is primarily responsible for ensuring the affected parties are notified of events communicated back to the root based on changes in state of the various nodes/functions comprising the tree. A secondary service of the root owner is maintaining and/or changing the configuration and functioning of the system.

During system installation, the root maybe temporarily owned by a seller and/or installer of the system. In this case the command and control function of the root is used to tailor the configuration of the system to the installation site and to verify and test the system. After installation is completed, root ownership is transferred to the monitoring service although in some cases ownership of the command and control function may be retained by the installation service or transferred to a separate service for the purpose of maintaining the installed equipment (i.e. a site maintenance service).

In embodiments hereof, protection is provided to prevent a competitive unit, the hijacking server 30 illustrated in phantom in FIG. 1, from displacing the authentic facility 22 and communicating with system 10. The hijacking service 30 can be at a location remote from any part of the system 10 or the authentic service facility 22, for example anywhere there is a network cloud connection.

A plurality of agents, indicated generally at 34, can be installed in the region R. The agents can be implemented as stand alone devices, such as 34 a, 34 b . . . 34 n. Alternately, agents can be implemented as add-ons or modules coupled to members of the plurality 14, as illustrated as 36 a, b, c . . . r.

It will be understood that the agents 36 could communicate with authentication software and/or circuits 12 c (which could be implemented with one or more microprocessors which execute that software) in the element 12, with one another, or via network 20 c with the authentic monitoring service 22.

The agents 36 implement, at least in part a secondary, de-centralized supervisory system which is superimposed over the more centralized monitoring system 10 as discussed above. Such agents can be regarded as residing in intermediate and/or edge nodes of the system 10. Intermediate nodes, as will be understood by those of skill, could include one or more control panels, power supplies, communications devices, or repeaters, or the like all without limitation. Edge nodes can include detectors, device control points, alarm indicting pull stations, user interface devices all without limitation.

In one aspect, agents may passively monitor events originating locally within a respective node. Alternately, respective agents can monitor system wide events. Agents are searching for patterns that indicate that system root authority, for example, monitoring service facility 22, has been compromised. In another aspect, agents can actively originate local events, as well as system wide events which might indicate that service facility 22 has been compromised by being displaced by hijacking service facility 30.

If an agent ascertains that root authority has been compromised (e.g. hijacked by a competing service provider), it initiates counter-measure actions (referred to below as ‘counter-measures’) to be carried out by the device which hosts the node(s) and agent(s) referred to above. The details and severity of the counter-measures are determined by taking into account specifics of the system installation and its users.

If a residential account has been compromised/hijacked then a more moderate and obscure response that directs user dis-satisfaction toward the hijacker's service maybe in order. This response may allow the system to continue working but generate intermittent, spurious, and annoying diagnostic messages which require costly on site visits by the hijacker's service.

On the other hand, if the system is installed in a bank, the response may include a blunt warning to the user's that the system has ceased to operate because the cyber-security of the system has been compromised.

The example responses described above could be initiated and implemented autonomously by edge devices such as user interfaces or sensors.

The above illustrate the de-centralized and nuanced aspects hereof. Likewise how it augments the centralized aspects of dealing with system hijackers and cyber threats.

From the foregoing, it will be observed that numerous variations and modifications may be effected without departing from the spirit and scope hereof. It is to be understood that no limitation with respect to the specific apparatus illustrated herein is intended or should be inferred. It is, of course, intended to cover by the appended claims all such modifications as fall within the scope of the claims. Further, logic flows depicted in the figures do not require the particular order shown, or sequential order, to achieve desirable results. Other steps may be provided, or steps may be eliminated, from the described flows, and other components may be add to, or removed from the described embodiments. 

1. A system comprising: a common control element; a plurality of input or output detectors coupled to the element, members of the plurality include, at least some of, condition sensors, security sensors or building automation related sensors; and at least one monitoring unit, wherein the monitoring unit evaluates selected communications to or from the control element or members of the plurality of detectors for one or more patterns which indicate that at least some of the communications are emanating from an unauthenticated source.
 2. A system as in claim 1 wherein the source comprises a monitoring service facility which communicates with at least some of the control elements or members of the plurality of detectors.
 3. A system as in claim 2 wherein in the event that the monitoring unit senses an unauthenticated source, at least one of generating notice messages, or altering performance of at least one system component is implemented.
 4. A system as in claim 2 wherein in response to successful authentication, the monitoring unit updates a local log.
 5. A system as in claim 4 where the unit transmits an authenticating indicium to the control element.
 6. A system as in claim 1 which includes a plurality of monitoring units wherein the units can monitor events originating in the system, or originate events to determine responses to determine if any events, or responses thereto are emanating from an authenticated source.
 7. A system as in claim 5 which includes a plurality of monitoring units wherein the units can monitor events originating in the system, or originate events to determine responses to determine if any events, or responses thereto are emanating from an authenticated source.
 8. A system as in claim 6 wherein the monitoring units comprise a de-centralized component which at least intermittently attempt to authenticate a source communicating with one or more of the control element or the detectors.
 9. A system as in claim 8 wherein in the presence of an authenticated source, the control element continues to communicate local sensed conditions to the source.
 10. A system as in claim 9 wherein in the presence of a source which cannot be authenticated, the units provide indicia to at least the control element indicative of the detected unauthenticated source.
 11. A method comprising: providing at least one of a regional monitoring, or, building automation system which can detect conditions in a predetermined region; providing a decentralized supervisory system which at least intermittently attempts to authentify communications between elements of the monitoring system and a supervisory facility.
 12. A method as in claim 11 which includes generating an indicator in response to an authentication failure.
 13. A method as in claim 12 communicating the indicator to at least some components of the at least one system.
 14. A method as in claim 13 wherein the supervisory system includes at least one of monitoring events, or, originating events in the at least one system and searching for patterns that indicate the presence of an authenticated supervisory facility.
 15. A method as in claim 14 includes generating selected trouble indicators in the presence of an unauthenticated supervisory facility.
 16. A method as in claim 15 which includes generating trouble indicators at a plurality of sites in the system and broadcasting them.
 17. An apparatus comprising: at least one of a security system, a condition monitoring system or a building automation system; and a supervisory system which includes a plurality of agents, the agents can detect communications associated with the at least one system wherein the supervisory system evaluates detected communications for one or more patterns which indicate that at least some of the communications are emanating from an unauthorized source.
 18. An apparatus as in claim 17 which includes a monitoring service facility which communicates with and provides services to the at least one system wherein the agents recognize the service facility as an authorized source.
 19. An apparatus as in claim 17 which includes circuitry for communicating with a wireless user device, and, responsive to determining that at least one sensed pattern indicates that at least some of the communications are emanating from an unauthorized source, the supervisory system transmits a warning indication to the user device.
 20. An apparatus as in claim 17 which includes circuitry for communicating with a wireless user device, and, responsive to determining that at least one sensed pattern indicates that at least some of the communications are emanating from an unauthorized source, the supervisory system transmits a performance altering indicium to the at least one system. 